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HOW BAD ARE MANDATORY ARBITRATION TERMS?
Omri Ben-Shahar*

There is a new bad boy in the contract law block: the mandatory
arbitrationclause. Increasingly pervasive in the boilerplate portion
of mass contracts, the mandatory arbitration clause controls the
manner by which aggrieved parties can vindicate their rights,
and-according to a widely held view--effectively diminishes access to justice.
Arbitration, a type of ADR, is surely a cheaper method, compared to litigation, to resolve contractual disputes. It may be a bit
crude in terms of administering ex-postjustice, but it is accessible,
relatively simple and procedurally-light. Many standard form contracts issued to consumers and employees now require arbitration
as a mandatory forum to resolve disputes with the seller, service
provider, or employer. But parallel to the rise of the mandatory
arbitration clause, we are witnessing a counter-movement among
commentators and in many courts, condemning this practice as
unconscionable.
There is by now plenty of legal thought on the question of
whether mandatory arbitration is an unconscionable commercial
practice.' This line of inquiry explores the opportunities that aggrieved individuals have to vindicate their legal rights through
arbitration. It tries to draw a line between types of arbitration procedures that are legitimate and ones that are unconscionable. It
focuses on factors like the cost of filing a claim for arbitration, the
types of remedies individuals can get through arbitration, the location of the arbitration proceedings, and the ability to aggregate
claims.
But while much legal attention has been directed to resolving
this unconscionability question and to mapping the various answers that come out in court decisions almost daily, less attention
has been directed to the more fundamental issue: is arbitration
indeed worse for individuals? Could it be that arbitration is actually
a better regime, ex ante, for aggrieved claimants? Do they fare better in arbitration?
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In much of the legal commentary, arbitration terms are de-

2
nounced as "the Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990's," a "monster,"0

and that as a result of them "large areas of U.S life and commerce
have silently been insulated from the lawsuit culture." 4 It is striking,

though, that courts which make policy decisions condemning or
approving of arbitration do so with very little reference to any empirical grounding. To illustrate the paucity of empirical knowledge,
compare these two statements in two prominent court decisions.
The first was made in the leading California Supreme Court case
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare,5 in which the court de-

cided that a mandatory arbitration clause was unconscionable.
Underlying the decision was a conjecture voiced by the court that
arbitration is an unfavorable forum for employees to vindicate
their claims, because they win less. Empirically, the court noted,
" [v] arious Studies show that arbitration is advantageous to employers not only because it reduces the costs of litigation, but also
because it reduces the size of the award that an employee is likely
to get, particularly if the employer is a 'repeat player' in the arbitration system."'
The court cited, in making this empirical generalization, two
published scholarly studies.
The second statement was made in another leading case, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki,7 in which the
court decided to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause and referred the case to arbitration. Here, underlying the decision was an
opposite conjecture, that employees are better able to vindicate
their claims through arbitration. Empirically, the court noted,
Employees fare well in arbitration with their employersbetter by some standards than employees who litigate, as the
lower total expenses of arbitration make it feasible to pursue
smaller grievances and leave more available for compensatory
awards .... Perhaps this is why unions find arbitration so attractive and insist that employers agree to this procedure."

2.
Katherine Van Wesel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The YellowDog Contractof the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017, 1017 (1996).
3.
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims inthe Ages of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. REv. 33, 36 (1997).
4.
Patti Waldmeir, How America is PrivatizingJusticeby the Back Door, FINANCIAL TIMES,
June 30, 2003, at 12.
5.
6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
6.
Id. at 690.
7.
374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004).
8.
Id. at 491.
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The court cited, as a reference for this empirical generalization,
one published study.
Surely, one's view about the empirical reality of arbitration-on
how well claimants fare relative to litigation-is not the only relevant factor in evaluating the legality of arbitration clauses. For
example, one might think that arbitration is bad but that arbitration clauses cannot be vacated under state contract law or the
Federal Arbitration Act. But it is striking that many of the attempts
to justify the competing views on legality are based on alleged empirical underpinnings. Unfortunately, these underpinnings have
not been fully developed to provide the desired foundations. We
simply do not know enough facts to pass ajudgment on arbitration
as a mandatory procedure.
This symposium aims at strengthening the empirical basis of the
debate over arbitration clauses. The four articles included all pursue the same question: Do we know whether arbitration is better or
worse for individual claimants, relative to litigation? The four articles approach this question without ideological priors, with various
methodologies and with different strategies on how to collect
clues.
In the first article, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It
Looks, 9 Theodore St. Antoine surveys much of the literature on arbitration in employment settings. He argues that, based on cost
data, arbitration is the only practical venue for low-paid aggrieved
employees. Arbitration does eliminate some remedies which are
potentially available in litigation, but renders the remaining remedies more accessible and effective. Still, St. Antoine's empirical
analysis suggests that the problems with arbitration can best be resolved, not by a preference for litigation, but rather by minimal
due process assurances.
The next two articles provide a broad overview of the entire existing stock of empirical studies. Each of these two articles tackles a
different empirical puzzle. In Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence,'° Christopher Drahozal provides a
comprehensive and critical assessment of the accessibility issue: Is
arbitration less accessible, due to upfront filing costs, relative to
litigation? Or is it more accessible, due to the relatively quicker
resolution of the dispute? The answer, it turns out, is more nuanced and more interesting than some have perceived it, and
depends on factors that the analysis in the article makes explicit.
9.
10.

41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 783 (2008).
41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 813 (2008).
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Drahozal also highlights the important empirical inquiry into the
comparative success of class arbitration.
In his article From Court-Surrogateto Regulatory Tool: Re-Framingthe
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration," Mark Weidemaier explores the other "big" question regarding arbitration versus
litigation: Do arbitration outcomes vary systematically from litigation outcomes? Do claimants win more or less often? Do they get
higher or lower awards, on average? Are outcomes reached faster?
Of course, underlying this empirical comparison lies a fundamental methodological problem of "filtering"-the cases in which the
outcomes are being compared are not necessarily comparable because of "selection" problems. Parties who arbitrate might differ
systematically from parties who litigate, and within each procedure
there are different factors that force cases to settle and thus to
"exit" the outcome sampling pool. Weidemaier surveys prior studies that compared outcomes and examines the perceived regularity
that plaintiffs win more often in arbitration, but the size of awards
is also smaller. He explores some concrete implications of the selection problems to this perceived regularity. He also notes, in the
employment context, that internal dispute resolution procedures
add an important and otherwise overlooked layer of filtering that
has immediate implications for the empirical comparison between
arbitration and litigation.
Finally, the fourth article in this symposium provides a new empirical study of the use of arbitration clauses by large corporations.
In Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,2 Theodore
Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin compare the contracts issued by big public corporations to their consumers with the
ones that they use in their business dealings. This comparison is
telling, because terms in negotiated business agreements are not
likely to be unconscionable. If the same terms are offered to consumers or employees, there is a lesser basis to object to them. In
fact, in his Oblix Inc. v. Wienicki decision cited above, Judge Easterbrook suggested this precise logic: "Businesses regularly agree to
arbitrate their disputes with each other; giving employees the same
satisfactory for
terms and forum (the AAA) that a firm deems
"3
commercial dispute resolution is not suspect.
Again, Judge Easterbrook's statement is based on an empirical
conjecture, which Eisenberg et al. set out to explore. They report a
11.
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13.

41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 843 (2008).
41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 871 (2008).
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striking regularity: arbitration clauses are used much more often in
consumer contracts than in business dealings. One possible interpretation of this finding, suggested in their article, is that the
arbitration clauses are used as a bar to class claims. Of course, one
might subscribe to a different interpretation, that the difference in
the complexity of the dealings and the economic stakes is the reason for different dispute resolution procedures. Still, regardless of
the interpretation placed on this finding, if it is indeed general it
suggests an empirical pattern that was previously overlooked.
This symposium was presented in the 2008 Annual Meeting of
the Contracts Section of the American Association of Law Schools.
Indeed, studying the unconscionability of arbitration terms has
become a standard feature of first-year contracts courses. This is
perhaps one of the hotter topics in today's contract law and policy.
Contractual rights, as they are enforced by contract law, might have
substantially different values depending on the venue through
which they can be vindicated. It is hard to predict how these values
differ, but hopefully this symposium will inform some of these predictions.
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